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Re: making Debian secure by default



* On 2024 01 Apr 16:55 -0500, Charles Curley wrote:
> On Mon, 1 Apr 2024 19:00:29 +0000
> Andy Smith <andy@strugglers.net> wrote:
> 
> > In my view a great example of the "people other than me just need to
> > get good" fallacy merged with the group of people predisposed to
> > hate systemd.
> > 
> > It could have been any direct or indirect dependency of sshd here.
> > I'm quite sure almost none of them have the required resources and
> > processes to detect something like this.
> 
> Easy, now. No-one is attacking systemd, and I don't think anyone wanted
> to start a systemd war. This could also have happened under System V
> initialization.

AIUI (please correct me if I am in error), any dependency chain that
then depends on something else could create a vulnerability.  I am
rather surprised to see that openssh-server has so many dependencies:

Depends: adduser, libpam-modules, libpam-runtime, lsb-base,
openssh-client (= 1:9.2p1-2+deb12u2), openssh-sftp-server, procps, ucf,
debconf (>= 0.5) | debconf-2.0, runit-helper (>= 2.14.0~), libaudit1 (>=
1:2.2.1), libc6 (>= 2.36), libcom-err2 (>= 1.43.9), libcrypt1 (>=
1:4.1.0), libgssapi-krb5-2 (>= 1.17), libkrb5-3 (>= 1.13~alpha1+dfsg),
libpam0g (>= 0.99.7.1), libselinux1 (>= 3.1~), libssl3 (>= 3.0.11),
libsystemd0, libwrap0 (>= 7.6-4~), zlib1g (>= 1:1.1.4)

Not all are libraries, but if IUC, libc6 shows to depend on libgcc-s1,
so if that library could be compromised, then openssh-server could be
vulnerable.  It's quite possible that I am wrong (hopefully) or we have
an even more massive problem.

> I have no doubt that this sort of thing has happened in the past, and I
> fully expect it will happen again in the future. However, the defect
> has been caught and repaired. The system for dealing with
> vulnerabilities is working, if not perfectly. The question now is: what
> lessons can we learn from it.

From what I am seeing right now discussions are centering around
comparing the file list associated with a VCS tag and a release tarball,
and somehow verifying the identity of contributors/committers.  I'm sure
other ideas are being discussed that I've not read.  Suffice it to say,
at the moment this is not being swept under the proverbial rug.

- Nate

-- 
"The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all
possible worlds.  The pessimist fears this is true."
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