--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Please unblock package libarchive
A security issue was reported and an upstream commit has been cherry-picked
to adress this issue. (Please note that this "vulnerability" is considered
a feature in other implementations/systems, but oh well.... uploaded anyway.)
See http://bugs.debian.org/778266
Thanks to contributors to that bug report.
See attached diff for changes included...
unblock libarchive/3.1.2-11
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 8.0
APT prefers testing-updates
APT policy: (500, 'testing-updates'), (500, 'testing'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Foreign Architectures: i386
Kernel: Linux 3.16.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=en_DK.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_DK.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 7b5c1ff..2f53cae 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+libarchive (3.1.2-11) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Add d/p/Add-ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS-option.patch
+ (Closes: #778266)
+
+ -- Andreas Henriksson <andreas@fatal.se> Thu, 05 Mar 2015 14:54:43 +0100
+
libarchive (3.1.2-10) unstable; urgency=medium
* Add d/p/Do-not-overwrite-file-size-if-the-local-file-header-.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/Add-ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS-option.patch b/debian/patches/Add-ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS-option.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08512dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/Add-ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS-option.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
+Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 12:07:45 +0100
+Subject: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
+
+This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
+---
+ cpio/bsdcpio.1 | 3 ++-
+ cpio/cpio.c | 2 ++
+ libarchive/archive.h | 2 ++
+ libarchive/archive_write_disk.3 | 3 +++
+ libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 6 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cpio/bsdcpio.1 b/cpio/bsdcpio.1
+index b3d0d40..7794b0a 100644
+--- a/cpio/bsdcpio.1
++++ b/cpio/bsdcpio.1
+@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ See above for description.
+ .It Fl Fl insecure
+ (i and p mode only)
+ Disable security checks during extraction or copying.
+-This allows extraction via symbolic links and path names containing
++This allows extraction via symbolic links, absolute paths,
++and path names containing
+ .Sq ..
+ in the name.
+ .It Fl J , Fl Fl xz
+diff --git a/cpio/cpio.c b/cpio/cpio.c
+index 6f57d95..f086203 100644
+--- a/cpio/cpio.c
++++ b/cpio/cpio.c
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
+@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ case OPTION_INSECURE:
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ break;
+ case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
+ cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive.h b/libarchive/archive.h
+index f56bc38..4e0b048 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive.h
++++ b/libarchive/archive.h
+@@ -562,6 +562,8 @@ __LA_DECL int archive_read_set_options(struct archive *_a,
+ /* Default: Do not use HFS+ compression if it was not compressed. */
+ /* This has no effect except on Mac OS v10.6 or later. */
+ #define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_HFS_COMPRESSION_FORCED (0x8000)
++/* Default: Do not reject entries with absolute paths */
++#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS (0x10000)
+
+ __LA_DECL int archive_read_extract(struct archive *, struct archive_entry *,
+ int flags);
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3 b/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
+index fa925cc..a2e7afa 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
+@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ The default is to not refuse such paths.
+ Note that paths ending in
+ .Pa ..
+ always cause an error, regardless of this flag.
++.It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++Refuse to extract an absolute path.
++The default is to not refuse such paths.
+ .It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE
+ Scan data for blocks of NUL bytes and try to recreate them with holes.
+ This results in sparse files, independent of whether the archive format
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+index bbd50a6..74c03b9 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+@@ -2504,8 +2504,9 @@ cleanup_pathname_win(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+ /*
+ * Canonicalize the pathname. In particular, this strips duplicate
+ * '/' characters, '.' elements, and trailing '/'. It also raises an
+- * error for an empty path, a trailing '..' or (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
+- * set) any '..' in the path.
++ * error for an empty path, a trailing '..', (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
++ * set) any '..' in the path or (if ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++ * is set) if the path is absolute.
+ */
+ static int
+ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+@@ -2524,8 +2525,15 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+ cleanup_pathname_win(a);
+ #endif
+ /* Skip leading '/'. */
+- if (*src == '/')
++ if (*src == '/') {
++ if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++ "Path is absolute");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
++ }
++
+ separator = *src++;
++ }
+
+ /* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
+ for (;;) {
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c b/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
+index 31c5bfd..2c94206 100644
+--- a/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
++++ b/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
+@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure)
+ assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
++ /*
++ * Without security checks, we should be able to
++ * extract an absolute path.
++ */
++ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ assert(0 == unlink("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp"));
++
++ /* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
++ assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS);
++ failure("Extracting an absolute path should fail here.");
++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ archive_entry_free(ae);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileNotExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_free(a));
+
+ /* Test the entries on disk. */
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 14f546b..8265fe7 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ Allow-the-option-to-use-no-2nd-stage-compression-wit.patch
Fix-test_archive_write_add_filter_by_name_lrzip-test.patch
fix-CVE-2013-0211.patch
Do-not-overwrite-file-size-if-the-local-file-header-.patch
+Add-ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS-option.patch
--- End Message ---